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INTRODUCTION
... whatever steps we may take to procure 
for this colony an adequate measure of 
external protection, let it never be 
forgotten that the first line of defence 
for every British colony in any part of 
the world ... is the narrow sea which 
divides Britain from Europe. That is our 
most important outwork, the key of our 
Imperial position, in the defence of which 
all Englishmen have a primary interest, 
and for which we must reserve our best 
ships and our best men. And, if we 
continue to attach any value to the name 
and the birthright which we have brought 
to these distant shores, we shall not 
grudge any sacrifice which shall insure 
the safety of that beloved land, which is 
the citadel of our race and the centre of 
our power.^
Such were the views of a leading Melbourne news­
paper, the Argus, in 1859. The Australian colonies, 
having attained self-government and the removal of commercial 
disabilities, were faced with the imminent withdrawal of 
British troops and had to consider their own responsibilities 
for defence. Eighty years later, Victoria, the colony in 
question, was one of the constituent parts of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, a fully autonomous dominion within 
the British Commonwealth of Nations. An enemy now most 
seriously threatened the key to the imperial position. On 
10 May 1940 Nazi Germany launched its blitzkrieg against 
western Europe. In less than one month the Channel ports 
fell under German control. On 22 June an armistice provided 
for the occupation of a large area of France, including the 
northern and Atlantic coasts, by German troops. During the
1 . The Melbourne Argus, 10 October, 1859.
anxious and hectic days of the Battle of Britain which 
followed, an official in the Australian Department of 
External Affairs took the time and trouble to copy out in 
longhand the eighty-year old editorial from the Argus. He
placed the copy on file among papers dealing with the
2problem of Australia's immediate defence. In New Zealand,
too, the government and people were eager to match the
3United Kingdom1s 'Dunkirk spirit' and would have found 
the extract an equally valuable guide to policy.
The attitude of Australia and New Zealand to the 
military disasters in Europe in 19^0 can be understood only 
in terms of their commitment to the principles of imperial 
defence; any threat to the British Isles, it was believed, 
was a threat to the existence of the whole British Empire 
and therefore to the security of the Pacific dominions. It 
was for this reason that the governments of Australia and 
New Zealand had co-operated fully with the allied war effort 
from the outbreak of the second world war: their warships 
were placed under the control of the Admiralty, their troops 
sent to the Middle East and their air forces employed largely 
in training crews for operation with the Royal Air Force.
In return for their co-operation in this imperial system the 
dominions had been promised the protection of the Royal 
Navy. Australia and New Zealand relied for their defence 
on the Singapore strategy: the notion that in the event of 
a threat to British interests in the Far East a British
p*CRS A981 item Defence 59, part 4. 
See below, p. 105.
fleet would sail out from European waters and, basing 
itself on modern and efficient naval facilities at the 
'impregnable fortress' of Singapore, would assume command 
of sea communications, thereby eliminating any danger to 
Anglo-Saxon civilization in the southern Pacific.
The Singapore strategy collapsed as soon as it was 
challenged by Japan; a British fleet failed to arrive from 
the West, the two British capital ships in the Pacific were 
sunk within three days of the opening of the Japanese 
campaign and Singapore island itself fell two months later, 
on 15 February, 1942. This thesis examines aspects of the 
defence policies of Australia and New Zealand in the thirty 
months from the outbreak of the second world war until this 
ignominious surrender. It deals with the defence relations 
between the Pacific dominions and the United Kingdom and 
concentrates on the place of Singapore in the imperial 
defence connection. No attempt has been made to treat 
other aspects of this connection, most notably the Empire 
Air Training Scheme which has already been the subject of a
4thorough and scholarly analysis. Even within the limits
of the Singapore strategy, the amount of primary source 
material which has recently become available is vast and the 
survey of Australia's and New Zealand's policies which 
follows is necessarily highly selective. Nor will the study
^---------------------------------------------------------- -----
‘J.M. McCarthy, 'Air Power and Australian Defence. A Study 
in Imperial Relations, 1923-1954' (Ph.D. thesis, Australian 
National University, 197i), chapter 5. See also the same 
author's article 'The Defence of Australia and the Empire 
Air Training Scheme, 1939-1942', forthcoming shortly in 
the Australian Journal of Politics and History.
attempt to deal with the military campaign in Malaya which
preceded the fall of Singapore, a topic which has already
5been covered in great detail in many other works.
By 1939 Australia and New Zealand had been basing 
their security upon Singapore for almost twenty years and the 
first chapter reviews briefly the development of that policy 
from 1919* Thereafter the study unfolds chronologically, 
except for the consideration, in Chapter Four, of the American 
role in the defence of the Pacific. The potential importance 
of the United States was a continuous theme in British, 
Australian and New Zealand policy but, perhaps because of 
the American refusal to enter into any binding obligations 
until the last moment, I have found it easier to deal with 
this topic separately.
The commitment by Australia and New Zealand to an 
imperial scheme of defence which failed has been heavily 
criticised. One Australian commentator has recently 
referred to his country's decision to send troops to the 
Middle East in the following disparaging terms:
Australia was permitted to enjoy the honour 
of fighting another war away from home.... 
its battle-hardened veterans experiencing 
the dubious privilege of earning new laurels 
in foreign fields.... Europe-minded men had 
rushed Australian forces to the aid of 
beleaguered Britain and left Australia to 
stand naked before her enemies.®
"For a list of some of these see below, p. 281, footnote 3^.
*P. Harrison-Mattley, 'Australia and the Far Eastern Crisis, 
1931-1933' (m.A. thesis, University of Sydney, 1 968), 
pp. 359-60.
5.
It is certainly true that traditional loyalties to Britain 
were an important guide for Australian policy; they were 
even more important for New Zealand, whose settlement in 
the nineteenth century had not been marked by that aliena­
tion from the 'mother country' which characterised some 
Australians. The attitudes of Australia and New Zealand 
would, 110 doubt, have been very different if they had never been 
part of the British Empire and had therefore been free from
emotional ties to their 'birthright' and 'that beloved land,
7which is the citadel of our race . . . ' . But it will be
contended that, given the imperial context within which the 
governments of the Pacific dominions had no choice but to 
gwork, their policies were determined at least as much by a 
self-interested and reasoned assessment of their own 
national needs as by imperialist sentiments or colonial 
instincts. A major reason for the opposition by 
Australia and New Zealand to the development of dominion 
status in the inter-war years had been a belief that their 
defence interests were identical with those of the British 
9Empire. But this was not a complacent attitude and this
thesis will aim to show that as their doubts about the 
Singapore strategy began to grow the governments in 
Australia and New Zealand acted both within and outside the 
confines of the imperial connection in an effort to find a 
supplement. In forming their policies, the two dominions 
See above, p. 1.g * On this question see below, pp. 29-34.
9 See, for example, I.C. MacGibbon, 'The Blue-Water 
Rationale. New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919- 
1939* (M.A. thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 197l)> 
pp. 5 1 - 5 2 and 6l, footnote 3 2.
were always aware of their special regional position and 
responsibilities in the Pacific.
Although Australia and New Zealand shared basically 
the same defence problem their solutions were by no means 
always identical. There were major differences between 
their views on the Singapore strategy in the inter-war years. 
And the disparities, as well as the similarities, in the aims 
and viewpoints of the two governments in the wartime period 
will, it is hoped, provide useful points of comparison and 
contrast to illuminate the general themes.
There were, of course, also differences of
attitude within each dominion. In New Zealand a Labour
government remained in office throughout the war years and a
large measure of continuity was therefore automatically
a c h i e v e d . T h e  political situation in Australia was much
more confused. During the first two years of war the
country was governed by the most factious administrations in
its history. Australia entered the war with a minority
government drawn from the United Australia Party and led by
R.G. Menzies; it relied for survival on the support of
the Country Party. In March 19^0 this arrangement gave way
to a formal coalition between the U.A.P. and the Country
Party with Menzies again Prime Minister. A general election
in September 19^0 gave an equal number of seats to the
^*In this thesis I refer to the Labour Parties and move­
ments in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand; 
the official spelling of the name in Australia is, of 
course, ’Labor' but for the sake of uniformity the English 
version will be used throughout the work.
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coalition and to the Labour Party, the balance of power 
going to two independents. Menzies failed to persuade 
Labour to enter a national government and continued to rule 
with the support of the Country Party, ’a coalition', 
according to the Official War Historian, 'of pieces rather 
than parties' which 'rested on a mass of shifting discon- 
tents'.’*’^" Indeed, the events of the next twelve months 
suggested that the United Australia Party was most inaptly 
named and Menzies finally resigned on 29 August, L94l.
His successor, A.W. Fadden, the leader of the Country Party, 
retained the same ministry. But the ramshackle coalition 
was defeated in the House of Representatives only one month 
later when the two independents changed their allegiance in 
favour of the Labour Party. The Governor-General then 
called upon John Curtin, leader of the Australian Labour 
Party, to form a government and Labour retained office for 
the remainder of the war. The A.L.P.'s defence policy in 
the inter-war years had been opposed to the Singapore
12strategy and antagonistic to the imperial connection. It
will be necessary, therefore, to consider the extent to 
which this change of government led to changes in Australian 
policy.
This study is based primarily on British and
Australian official government papers available in the
Public Record Office, London, and the Commonwealth Archives
^ ’P. Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-19^*3 
(Australia in the War of 1939-194r)T Seri os 4 , C i v i I ,
Vols. 1 and 2, Canberra, 1952 and L970), Vol. I. I 9 39- 
1942, p. 280.
12." ‘See below, pp.24-26.
Offices, Canberra and Melbourne. As access to the Australian 
material has been granted to researchers only very 
recently many of my sources, which are described in a note
13at the beginning of the bibliography, have not been used 
before in a work of this kind. Constraints of money and 
time unfortunately precluded research on the archives in 
Wellington but this omission is partly offset by the excell­
ent example shown to other governments by the authorities in
New Zealand who have published three substantial volumes of
14their wartime documents. In view of the availability of
this source, and the important differences, on occasions, 
between Australian and New Zealand's policy, I have felt 
justified in including New Zealand within the scope of this 
thesis although her policies are not examined in as great 
a degree of detail as those of Australia, or the United 
Kingdom.
13 See below, pp. 317 - 20.14.‘Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the 
Second World War, 1939-1945, (3 VolsWellington, 1949-
1 9 6 3.)
